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ABSTRACT 
The distinction between reversible and irreversible phenomena in biological information systems pro-
vides a basis for distinguishing microevolution from macroevolution. Biological transitions encom-
pass the entire class of irreversible changes in biological systems, including physiological and devel-
opmental phenomena. Evolutionary transitions are the subset of biological transitions that have an 
impact on the quality and quantity of biological information transmitted to future generations. Evolu-
tionary transitions are manifested empirically as macroevolutionary changes, i.e. evolutionary changes 
that can be detected only through phylogenetic analysis among groups of species sharing a unique 
common ancestry. 
1 TWO RECENT PERSPECTIVES  
The past 20 years have witnessed significant conceptual breakthroughs in understanding 
the fundamental nature of biological systems, and their evolutionary fate over space and 
through time (see, e.g., references in Brooks, 2000, 2001 and in this contribution). I be-
lieve that such conceptual advances (the ‘text’ of biological theory) must become embed-
ded in ongoing empirical biological research (the ‘context’ of biological theory) if they 
are to have lasting impact. In this contribution, I will first discuss two complementary 
conceptual views of biological evolution, that of Brooks and Wiley (1988) and of May-
nard Smith and Szathmary (1995). I will then propose a simplified taxonomy of biologi-
cal and evolutionary transitions stemming from those views, within which the ‘major 
transitions’ of Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) nest. Finally, I will briefly discuss 
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some current empirical research programmes in macroevolution that can contribute di-
rectly to the discovery and evaluation of evolutionary transitions. 
...there are two factors: namely, the nature of the organism and the nature of the condi-
tions. The former seems to be much more the important for nearly similar variations 
sometimes arise under, as far as we can judge, dissimilar conditions; and, on the other 
hand, dissimilar variations arise under conditions which appear to be nearly uniform. 
(Darwin 1872: 32 [italics added]). 
A necessary first step in encouraging working biologists to consider novel explana-
tions for their findings is to show how such explanations (and the conceptual framework 
from which they stem) extend and improve the existing framework. The above statement 
by Darwin in the 6th edition of Origin of Species is a good starting point. The develop-
ment of Neo-Darwinian thought during the second half of the 20th century, however, em-
phasized the nature of the conditions rather than the nature of the organism, often to such 
an extent that neo-Darwinian explanations began to sound very Lamarckian indeed. 
Gould and Lewontin (1979) emphasized this trend in calling research on adaptive evolu-
tion ‘Panglossian.’ 
Two recent proposals from within evolutionary biology attempt to bring the nature 
of the organism back to centre stage in evolutionary biology. Both of these proposals 
have found it convenient to couch their discussions in terms of the dynamics of informa-
tion. Brooks and Wiley (1988; Brooks, 2000, 2001) suggested that evolution is caused by 
the entropic increase in biological information within genetic (more properly ‘inheritance 
systems’: Jablonka and Lamb, 1995) phase space constrained historically, due to both 
internal (nature of the organism, or ‘text’) and external (nature of the conditions, or ‘con-
text’) factors. They characterized evolution as stochastically generated yet having irre-
versible increases in informational complexity, including the emergence of new levels of 
organization, each of which is accompanied by the emergence of a novel form of ‘cohe-
sion’, a class of material properties linking parts into wholes. Maynard Smith and Szath-
mary (1995) proposed that major transitions in evolution are caused by the evolution of 
increased efficiency of storing and transmitting information. Major transitions are charac-
terized by contingently irreversible emergence of new levels of organization and in-
creased complexity. One outcome of these transitions are changes that ameliorate ‘con-
flicts of interest’ (those aspects of the nature of the conditions comprising the selection 
arena) arising from the independently evolved ‘nature of the organism’ for each species. 
Both views converge on a common perspective: there are no strictly macroevolutionary 
or strictly microevolutionary processes. Rather, there are a variety of evolutionary proc-
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esses, with different manifestations on different spatial and temporal scales and at differ-
ent levels of biological organization (see also Maurer, 1991; Gould, 1995; Conway Mor-
ris, 1995). This means there is no single objective spatial or temporal scale for studying 
evolution, and evolutionary studies need to focus on finding the appropriate scale for in-
voking particular explanations. For this, we need a meta-theory to integrate microevolu-
tion and macroevolution. 
That meta-theory comes from considering biological information as a statistical 
mechanical phenomenon. All evolutionary dynamics are statistical in nature, forming 
microstates (organisms and groups of organisms) that can be described ecologically by 
something like the Hutchinson niche and in evolutionary terms by demes and popula-
tions. The statistical summation over all members of any evolutionary lineage (a ‘com-
munity of descent’ sensu Darwin, 1872) are the macrostates, which can be described 
ecologically by something like the Elton niche and in evolutionary terms by Simpson’s 
(1944, 1953) Evolutionary Species Concept (see also Wiley, 1981) and his view of adap-
tive zones, embodying a fundamental duality in which macroscopic biological systems 
were simultaneously genealogical and ecological entities—hence his use of the term 
Quantum Evolution (for an excellent review of the debate within mainstream evolution-
ary biology about micro- and macroevolution see Eldredge) (Eldredge, 1985). 
As noted above, Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) proposed that the major 
transitions in evolution are characterized by the evolution of increased efficiency of stor-
ing and transmitting information. Brooks and Wiley (1988) proposed that cohesive prop-
erties, ranging from molecular affinities to cell-cell adhesion to genetic compatibility, 
mate recognition, and genealogy, are analogous to inertia in physical systems, and are 
essential in allowing the emergence and persistence of macroscopic properties. The major 
transitions in evolution discussed by Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) are all asso-
ciated with the emergence of new forms of cohesion, which permit information to be 
stored and transmitted more efficiently. It is in the recognition of the significance of co-
hesive properties that we find the key to understanding microstate/macrostate distinctions 
in biological systems. A recent discussion of the nature of species illustrates this point. 
2 THE NATURE OF SPECIES 
Species comprise historical lineages forming ‘communities of descent’ (Darwin, 1859, 
1872) that comprise, at any given time, spatially-distributed complex information systems 
(Brooks and Wiley, 1988; Brooks & McLennan, 2002). Kornet (1993a,b; Kornet and 
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McAllister, 1993; Kornet et al., 1995) added an important dimension to this perspective. 
Viewing species as historical lineages subdivided into smaller historical lineages extend-
ing through time she proposed that when one of these smaller lineages experiences a 
permanent, or irreversible, split from the others, the relationship between that lineage and 
the others changes from a microevolutionary to a macroevolutionary one. The divergent 
lineage is called a macrospecies to indicate that permanent split from its ancestor and 
may now produce its own complement of smaller lineages extending through time, which 
constitute its own microspecies. 
‘Microspecies’ is a general term encompassing all those assemblages of conspecific 
organisms that biologists have called demes, subspecies, differentiated populations, geo-
graphical races, or incipient species. Two implications link these terms. First, the group 
of organisms being considered can be distinguished objectively in some manner relevant 
to the dynamics of inherited biological information. Second, there is a probability that 
this group will become a (macro)species in its own right, but has not done so yet (an 
event often difficult to determine empirically). Microspecies thus represent the realm of 
what is happening right now and the realm of possibilities for the future. The microspe-
cies of any given macrospecies may be relatively numerous and locally differentiated yet 
highly similar due to their close common history, so naturally replicated exemplars will 
abound, including the locally adapted populations of Williams (1992) and the coevolu-
tionary mosaic of Thompson (1994). 
Demographic phenomena, such as local extinctions and fusions with other mi-
crospecies as a result of dispersal and gene flow, limit the number of microspecies that 
become macrospecies in their own right. This is exactly the emerging pattern in studies of 
Phylogeography (Avise, 2000). Phylogeographers are interested in describing the “de-
ployment of genetic variation within species” (Zink 1996:308). This deployment is un-
covered by reconstructing phylogenetic relationships among populations then examining 
the effects of relatedness (phylogeny) and geography on differences in the genetic struc-
ture of those populations (microspecies). One major generalization arising from these 
studies is that relationships among populations within a species are complex and reticu-
lated, often showing only moderate to very little differentiation, as indicated by the oc-
currence of numerous, equally parsimonious or statistically indistinguishable phyloge-
netic trees. Although relationships among microspecies are often ambiguous, many phy-
logeographic studies have detected statistically significant groups of populations which 
exhibit unambiguous phylogenetic relationships among themselves. 
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Kornet’s criterion of reversible and irreversible splits for distinguishing microspe-
cies from macrospecies thus provides a clear component differentiation in micro- and 
macroevolution. That component is not one of magnitude, but of quality. It embodies the 
quality of the cohesion holding the microspecies together as a single ‘collective entity’, as 
well as time and history. New macrospecies are the fundamental products of evolutionary 
transitions. As Futuyma (1989) suggested, population/demic-level changes are likely to 
have no net evolutionary impact unless they are partitioned by speciation, meaning the 
production of new macrospecies. Thus, while there may only be one fundamental kind of 
evolution, there can be two fundamental kinds of evolutionary outcomes, reversible ones 
and irreversible ones. I propose that biological transitions encompass the entire class of 
irreversible changes, including physiological and developmental phenomena, and that 
evolutionary transitions are the subset of those irreversible changes that have an impact 
on the quality and quantity of biological information transmitted to future generations. 
3 CLASSES OF EVOLUTIONARY TRANSITIONS 
Evolutionary transitions encompass a wide range of irreversible phenomena in biol-
ogy, but not all evolutionary transitions produce equally significant outcomes. Therefore, 
it might be fruitful to attempt to classify various kinds of transitions. Brooks and McLen-
nan (2002) characterized three categories of evolutionary transitions thus: 
Category 1: Playing the game, or taking advantage of opportunities permitted by 
the game 
Such evolutionary transitions are the easiest to achieve (least costly in time and genetic 
change), yet provide the least evolutionary payoff in terms of diversification. They re-
quire only altered environmental conditions, such as geographic isolation leading to 
speciation. To return to Darwin, such transitions require only a change in the nature of 
the conditions, and not the nature of the organism. Janzen (1985) generalized this with his 
concept of ecological fitting. For example, most biologists also believe that parasitism is 
a one-way street, so that once a lineage becomes parasitic, it remains parasitic until or 
unless it goes extinct. Siddall et al. (1993), however, showed that the common ancestor of 
the diplomonad flagellates was parasitic, and that within the group Hexamita inflata and 
members of Trepomonas have reverted to the free-living mode of existence. What makes 
this case congruent with ecological fitting is the recognition that all free-living diplomo-
nads live in anaerobic aquatic sediments which often contain high levels of decaying or-
ganic matter and their associated bacteria, similar to the intestinal environments in which 
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their relatives live. In other words, the ‘nature of the conditions’ for both free-living para-
sitic species in this group are similar enough that the division between ‘parasitic’ and 
‘free-living’ is almost arbitrary. Similarly, Trouvé et al. (1998) reported that the life his-
tory traits of parasitic flatworms are most similar to the life history traits of their free-
living relatives, indicating that these species do not have a ‘parasitic’ but rather a ‘platy-
helminth’ (phylum Platyhelminthes, also known as flatworms, including the familiar free-
living forms called planarians and parasitic forms called flukes and tapeworms) mode of 
life which functions well in a host-parasite context. Thus, even the adoption of a new 
mode of life, whose outcome is highly significant in evolutionary terms, may not require 
an equally significant origin. 
Category 2: Changing the rules of the game – changing the dimensions of the evolu-
tionary arena 
Ross (1972) established a major component of the foundation of historical ecology when 
he discovered that only approximately one out of every thirty speciation events for a vari-
ety of insect groups was correlated with shifts from the plesiomorphic (ancestral) ecology 
to any apomorphic (derived) ecology. Ross concluded that though such shifts were im-
portant components of insect community structure and complexity, they occurred much 
less frequently than the origin of new species. Furthermore, he felt that there were no 
predictable patterns explaining the shifts that did occur and suggested that ecological di-
versification in evolution comprised a biological ‘uncertainty principle’. In other words, 
we cannot predict when and where a new set of rules for playing the ‘game’ of surviving 
and reproducing in a given ecosystem will evolve, though we can document their origin 
and subsequent effects. 
Category 3: Changing the game—creating new evolutionary arenas 
This type of evolutionary transition involves explanations for the origins of major modes 
of life that also depend on specialized morphology, behavior, or ecology often correlated 
with special conditions. The most fundamental of these transitions, as recognized by 
Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) is the origin of life itself (see also Wicken, 1987; 
Depew and Weber, 1995). Such transitions are the most difficult to achieve, because they 
require the conjunction of at least two innovations, each one improbable in itself. (May-
nard Smith and Szathmary (1995) noted that such conjunctions would be sufficient to 
make such transitions effectively irreversible, at least long enough to serve as constraints 
on future evolution (Brooks and Wiley 1988; Brooks, 2001). As great as the ‘cost’ (diffi-
culty) of achieving such innovations, the evolutionary payoff for such transitions can be 
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very large; such transitions lie at the base of explanations for many species-rich, widely-
distributed and abundant groups. Maynard Smith and Szathmary’s major transitions are 
all examples of this category. 
4 DISCOVERING EVOLUTIONARY TRANSITIONS 
‘The processes of life can be adequately displayed only in the course of life throughout 
the long ages of its existence’ (Simpson 1960: 9). 
We want to know something about the history of life on earth that can be deduced 
from properly understood relationships of groups of species—rare and old events, proc-
esses occurring on time scales longer than the lifespan of single species, events that had a 
significant impact on the evolution of species and the ecosystems they form. For evolu-
tionary explanations, the nature of the organism is most strongly embodied in phylogeny, 
the history of descent with modification which accounts for most similarities among or-
ganisms as well as the evolutionary lineages they form.  
Phylogenetic systematics provides biologists with a rigorous methodology to help 
study both the patterns and mechanisms of evolution (Brooks and McLennan, 2002). As a 
consequence of that and renewed interest in a broader and more inclusive view of evolu-
tionary theory, a new perspective has emerged within empirical biology, based on the 
concept that evolution is a complex phenomenon resulting from various interacting proc-
esses, termed ‘forces’ or ‘constraints,’ operating on different temporal and spatial scales. 
Evolutionary processes that occur at rates fast enough to be manifested as change within 
a single macrospecies are included within the domain of microevolution. By contrast, 
processes that occur at such slow rates that their effects are manifested in among-species 
patterns, are macroevolutionary. Microevolution and macroevolution are thus considered 
to be inextricably entwined as parts of a more inclusive whole, each domain represented 
by the hierarchical nature of biological systems (Salthe, 1985, 1993). If macroevolution is 
neither autonomous from, nor reducible to, microevolution, robust evolutionary explana-
tions must integrate require data from both sources. For example, because macroevolu-
tionary processes operate so slowly, they help define the boundaries within which micro-
evolution takes place. That is, they can affect the ways in which and the extent to which 
local populations respond to selection pressures.  
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5 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HISTORY 
Brooks and Wiley (1988) asserted that history plays a central role in evolutionary irre-
versibility. Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) gave form to this intuition by suggest-
ing that biological processes become effectively irreversible whenever two or more indi-
vidually improbable events (stemming from either the nature of the organism or the na-
ture of the conditions) effect an inheritable change in the nature of the organism. The 
odds against two improbable events occurring at the same time in the proper sequence for 
a specific biological system at any particular time under particular circumstances are as-
tronomically large. History decreases those odds when the first improbable event be-
comes incorporated into the retained evolutionary history (heredity transmitted informa-
tion) of a species. The second improbable event can now occur at any time, in any place, 
and the species will respond accordingly. In other words, history increases the probability 
that the first improbable event will still be part of the system when a second improbable 
event occurs. 
Brooks and Wiley (1988) further suggested that cohesive properties of biological 
systems ranging from cell-cell adhesion and recognition, to sexual reproduction and spe-
cific mate recognition systems, to common phylogenetic history, are especially important 
to evolutionary explanations. For them, cohesive properties of living systems limit both 
the ways and the extent to which populations can respond to environmental selection, and 
are the ‘glue’ of functional integration and hierarchical organization so characteristic of 
biological systems (Wake and Roth, 1989). Many biological processes that give rise to 
irreversible behaviour manifest such changes as a result of interactions among cohesive 
factors, which tend to keep biological systems intact and stable in the face of environ-
mental perturbations, and diversifying factors, which tend to split them into separate sys-
tems. Speciation in sexually reproducing species, for example, results when developmen-
tal and reproductive constraints acting as cohesive forces maintaining a macrospecies as a 
single lineage are overridden by environmental forces—the best known of which is geo-
graphic isolation severing information flow that splits the lineage apart into descendant 
macrospecies (Wiley, 1981). This is the reason Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) 
associated the origin of sex with the origin of true biological species—sex (including the 
self-repair capabilities of DNA in sexual reproduction; Bernstein et al., 1988) is informa-
tionally cohesive at the level of multiple local lineages (microspecies). Brooks and Wiley 
(1988) thus proposed that the cohesive nature of sex was a critical part of resolving the 
dilemma of the ‘cost of sex’. In a complementary fashion, the environmental boundaries 
within which each species lives might be pronounced enough in some cases to be consid-
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ered extrinsic cohesion in the form of stabilizing selection (Collier, 1998, 2000). Again, 
each of the major transitions of Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) are associated with 
the emergence of a novel form of cohesion. Interestingly, this view returns us to Darwin 
(1872: 158), “Homologous parts tend to vary in the same manner, and homologous parts 
tend to cohere.” 
6 EVOLUTIONARY TRANSITIONS IN A COEVOLUTIONARY 
SYSTEM 
The coevolutionary history of leaf beetles (Ophraella) and their host plants presented by 
Knowles et al. (1999) provides an excellent illustration of all three categories of evolu-
tionary transitions (see Figure and for further details, see Brooks and McLennan, 2002). 
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Figure 1: Three categories of evolutionary transitions in coevolution in the evolution of Ophraella. Dotted 
lines = category 1; bold lines = category 2; thick line at base of phylogenetic tree = category 3 (this oc-
curred prior to the origin of Ophraella). 
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Most of the speciation in the group took place within the context of the ancestral 
host resource, i.e. staying with the ancestral host during speciation, or speciating in asso-
ciation with host switching among members of the same tribe (transition category 1). 
Many of those events evidently occurred in a burst during the Plio-Pleistocene, a time of 
substantial environmental change (Knowles et al., 1999: see Brooks and McLennan, 2002 
for other studies suggesting periodic bursts of speciation). This implies that rates of 
speciation may have increased during that period of environmental crisis because the bee-
tles were given the opportunity to host switch e.g., increased sympatry of previously allo-
patric hosts bearing the plesiomorphic resource as organisms were forced together in rap-
idly shrinking refuge areas. These transitions occurred as a result of a change in the na-
ture of the conditions alone. Colonization of more distantly related host plants (transition 
category 2) encompasses fewer events, and as yet there is no indication that these events 
were correlated with each other or with any particular episode of environmental change. 
These transitions likely involved the evolution of novel abilities enabling the insects to 
utilize new host resources (a change in the nature of the organism) leading to novel 
Ophraella/plant associations, adding to the evolutionary complexity of the dimensions of 
the arena and adding new rules to the game (in the form of new types of associations). 
Finally, that Ophraella spp. are herbivores in the first place is phylogenetically con-
servative in the Chrysomelidae (all of which are herbivores). Is the evolution of herbivory 
an example of transition (transition category 3)? To answer this question, we must con-
sider the origin of herbivory in animals in general. I believe herbivory is a good candidate 
as a major transition in evolution, although not immediately recognizable as such. That 
there are tremendous ecological benefits and impacts of herbivory on both the power and 
stability of ecosystems (Ulanowicz, 1986, 1997) and on the structure of communities 
(Brown, 1995; Maurer, 1999) is uncontested. The link between the stability, resilience, 
and persistence of ecosystems in which herbivory plays a role and increased efficiency of 
information storage and transfer associated with Maynard Smith and Szathmary’s major 
transitions is indirect but clearly inferred from those ecological benefits.  
No metazoan has ever evolved the ability to digest cellulose. Whether this means it 
is impossible, or merely that it is so improbable that is has not yet happened, is unknown. 
Nonetheless, in order for metazoans to be herbivores, they need help. Three things must 
happen, each of which is a priori improbable: (1) obtain a source of cellulose-digesting 
microbes or protists; (2) provide a suitable environment for them in the intestine; and (3) 
provide a mechanism for passing them on to your offspring. According to Maynard Smith 
and Szathmary (1995), this should be sufficient to ensure that the adoption of herbivory is 
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irreversible—it is an evolutionary transition. The fossil record suggests that this is so; 
during the major extinction events, herbivores become extinct, and the re-emergence of 
terrestrial ecosystems is associated with the evolution of herbivory in a few surviving 
lineages of faunivores (Sues, 2000). The evolutionary cost of herbivory is that it is diffi-
cult to achieve, thereby explaining why herbivory is not the ancestral feeding mode in 
any major metazoan group (with the possible exception of the Mollusca), why it has 
originated so few times, and why its origin cannot be predicted in advance (Sues, 2000). 
The evolutionary benefits are manifestly large, sufficient to structure and power terres-
trial ecosystems globally, thereby explaining the evolutionary success (in terms of geo-
graphic distribution, species richness, and total biomass) of the lineages in which it arises. 
This is the manner in which herbivory is associated with increased efficiency of informa-
tion storage and transfer, an essential aspect of Maynard Smith and Szathmary’s concept 
of major transitions. Finally, we need to ask if herbivory requires special conditions. I 
believe this may be true, although again in an indirect manner. Given the enormous evo-
lutionary payoffs accruing to those lineages that become herbivorous, it is possible that 
the first lineages adopting this mode of life proliferate and diversify so rapidly that they 
themselves effectively change the nature of the conditions such that it become increas-
ingly difficult for new lineages to establish themselves at all, and or them to become 
widespread if they do become established (pre-emptive competition, or ‘survival of the 
first’). In population genetics, this is known as the Allee Effect; a further implication of 
this is that the newer version of a trait may actually be better adapted than the older, but 
not so much that the advantage of the ubiquitous nature of the older trait can be overcome 
by displacive competition. New origins of herbivory are inhibited unless those conditions 
are fundamentally changed again, as in the case of major extinctions due to global envi-
ronmental catastrophes or change. In this manner, a fundamental (but a priori difficult to 
achieve) change in the nature of the organism leads to a fundamental change in the nature 
of the conditions. Maynard Smith (1976) noted that much of the environment (nature of 
the conditions) relevant to biological systems consists of products of genealogical proc-
esses (see also Brook and Wiley, 1988). I thus believe that herbivory qualifies as a major 
transition in evolution. 
7 EVALUATING EVOLUTIONARY TRANSITIONS 
The above discussion invokes a simple cost/benefit argument to help classify a par-
ticular type of evolutionary transition. I believe this is potentially a useful means of 
evaluating proposed evolutionary transitions. The informational nature of the organism 
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ensures the existence of independent relatively autonomous entities occupying the same 
space at the same time, which also provides the possibility of evolutionary conflicts of 
interest. As evolutionary diversification proceeds from the origin of life, the diversifica-
tion of species, all confined to this single planet, made such conflicts inevitable. Biologi-
cal research has demonstrated that such conflicts of interest abound; indeed, the existence 
of such conflicts arising from the relatively autonomous nature of the organism creates 
the various selection arenas (Brooks, 2000, 2001). More fundamentally, in a world con-
trolled by the Second Law of Thermodynamics there is no free lunch; everything is a 
trade-off, beginning with the most fundamental issues of trade-offs between energy used 
and work done, between energy stored as structure (biomass, including the information 
system itself) and energy dissipated as a result of making and maintaining that structure. 
To the extent that biological information has a material basis, it must have an energetic 
cost, which must be assessed in the context of survival. 
8 THE MACROEVOLUTIONARY COST/BENEFIT ARENA 
The simplest cost/benefit arena can be depicted as a 2 X 2 contingency table, de-
picting interactions between two binary variables. Each of the four cells in such a table 
represent evolutionary outcomes, sometimes called strategies, each of which specifies a 
set of costs and benefits. Again in the simplest case, the cell which represents the greatest 
net benefit is predicted to be the strategy observed in nature. Departures from expecta-
tions imply additional factors influencing the system. Large amounts of biological com-
plexity can be added to cost/benefit analyses, and microevolutionary studies have used 
this approach with great success.  
To convert this to a macroevolutionary arena, we need to consider the evolutionary 
history, i.e., the origins, of variables representing any putative evolutionary transition, to 
help us explain what irreversible events happened and why, complementing predictions 
of what reversible dynamic changes might happen, and why. Consider the simple case in 
which one variable represents changes in the nature of the organism as ‘easy to achieve’ 
(cases of ecological fitting and vicariant speciation being special cases in which no 
change was necessary) or ‘difficult to achieve’ while the other variable represents 
changes in the nature of the conditions, represented as ‘not required’ and ‘required’. In 
the simple classification presented above, category 1 transitions would be ‘easy to 
achieve’ and ‘no special conditions required’, category 2 transitions would be ‘easy to 
achieve’ and ‘special conditions required’ (2a) or ‘difficult to achieve’ and ‘no special 
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conditions required’ (2b), and category 3 transitions would be ‘difficult to achieve’ and 
‘special conditions required’.  
When an evolutionary transition is associated with the origin of a species, we can 
envision a set of such tables summed over the evolution of a clade (e.g., Ophraella as 
discussed above) permitting us to ask questions such as, where did the clade enter the 
game. Eexpanding the scale of the study phylogenetically can also answer the questions 
of when did the clade enter the game and what game was it playing before? What was the 
sequence of exploration of the cells? Are there any empty cells? If there are multiple oc-
currences of the same cell, did it arise form the same source and in the same manner in 
each case? Did any member of the clade ever leave the game, and if so, from which cell, 
and where did it go—including the case of going extinct?  
Adopting the perspective of cost/benefit analyses also enables us to understand the 
most fundamental benefit of retained history – it lowers the cost of evolution. Retained 
history lowers the cost of innovation, because innovations are modifications of only part 
of pre-existing information. New traits need not be produced de novo, and their expres-
sion is ‘pre-screened’ through developmental dynamics based on the non-modified com-
ponents which determine whether or not the innovation is ‘permitted’ i.e. if it disrupts 
overall developmental, including reproductive integrity (cohesion). Retained history also 
lowers the cost of specialization—specialists on widespread persistent ancestral resources 
have options for survival and evolutionary diversification under changing conditions 
(ecological fitting). Finally, retained history lowers the cost of adaptability, as most 
adaptability is accumulated history. 
9 A RESEARCH PROGRAM FOR MACROEVOLUTIONARY 
COST/BENEFIT ANALYSES 
The past decade has witnessed an explosion of experimental studies informed by 
phylogenetic information directly documenting evolutionary mechanisms, even those op-
erating in the distant past. David Wake (1991) proposed that an understanding of the evo-
lution of biological form required an integration of ‘neo-Darwinian functionalism and 
biological structuralism, in a context of rigorous phylogenetic analysis’ (see also Histori-
cal Structuralism of Brooks and Wiley, 1988). This has led to two macroevolutionary 
research programs, Historical Ecology (Brooks, 1985; Brooks and McLennan, 2002) and 
Integrative Biology (Wake and Roth, 1989). The goal of both research programs is to 
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provide rigorous explanations for the origin, persistence (stasis), and diversification of 
the species traits that provide the foundation for complex evolutionary systems.  
The Ophraella patterns discussed above are an example of historical ecology, and 
set the stage for studies in integrative biology. Wake (1991) described the integrative bi-
ology perspective as the desire to differentiate instances of evolutionary change due to 
selection (nature of the conditions) and those due to ‘design constraints’ (nature of the 
organism). Integrative biology involves efforts in diverse fields including functional 
morphology, neurobiology, physiology, reproductive biology, and developmental biology 
(for a list of relevant publications, see Brooks and McLennan, 2002). Placing the results 
of studies in integrative biology in a cost/benefit context provides a powerful research 
program for evaluating the nature of evolutionary transitions. Mechanistic components of 
integrative studies can tell us the costs and benefits; phylogenetic studies can tell us 
where each lineage got into the game, and how many times and in what sequence it took 
advantage of the opportunities, changed the rules, or even changed the game.  
Retained phylogenetic history thus allows considerable biological complexity to 
evolve, and survive through ecological fitting, extending the time period during which 
evolutionary experiments, leading to evolutionary transitions can occur. It lowers the 
global cost of evolutionary origins and persistence while not sacrificing the benefits of 
local adaptation.  
10 SUMMARY 
The conceptual framework summarized above treats organisms and the systems 
they form as information systems retaining much of their phylogenetic history. I believe 
this contribution provides a glimpse of the power of that perspective in linking theoretical 
(‘text’) and empirical (‘context’) research programs. There is still much to be accom-
plished, in terms of priorities, terminology, and better understanding of both general and 
specific phenomena through both empirical studies and modelling efforts. Nonetheless, I 
believe it is time to consider all such debates to be part of the vigorous activities of a 
growing and progressive research program, rather than a collection of mutually exclusive 
competing alternatives. This will lead us back to the panoramic view of biology in an 
evolutionary context first articulated by Darwin. It will also provide hope of encompass-
ing the enormous amount of biological discoveries since Darwin, along with more fun-
damental developments in statistical mechanics, non-equilibrium thermodynamics and 
self-organization, information theory, and complexity theory (for additional discussion 
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and references, see Wicken, 1987; Weber, Depew, and Smith, 1988; Csanyi, 1989; Ma-
tsuno, 1989; Kampis, 1991; Kauffman, 1993; Depew and Weber, 1995; Van de Vijver, 
Salthe, and Delpos, 1998; and Taborsky, 2000) in a truly unifying, if not unified, theory 
of biology.  
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